Siege of Leningrad

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An interesting article about the siege of Leningrad: О математике и исторической реальности – Новости РуАН
Translation below:

Alexey Kungurov
About Mathematics and Historical Reality

Analyzing a little more carefully the quite open and even well-known information, it is easy to find such amazing things that it just makes your head spin. This article tells of some miracles in the besieged Leningrad...

As you walk around St. Petersburg, you notice that every house and every monument reminds you of the great historical past of this city. The great and heroic past is not disputed by anyone, but the conditions in which ordinary people had to make inhuman efforts, starve and die, on closer examination, turn out to have been artificially created.

From the history of the siege of Leningrad we know that during the war the city was subjected to intense bombing and artillery fire. On the walls of houses in St. Petersburg you can still see old signs saying that this side is safe from shelling, and on the facades of houses you can see the marks of shells that hit them.

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Under these conditions, the inhabitants of Leningrad performed feats every day, worked hard and slowly starved to death. To raise the morale, at one time the political department of Leningrad had the idea to glorify the immortal feats of the inhabitants of the city, and in one of its newspapers appeared a note about the heroic work of Leningrad residents under constant bombardment. It gave information that 148478 shells fell on the territory of Leningrad. This figure became the standard and for all years of blockade, was fixed in the minds of historians, and they could not get rid of it.

Here is how historians describe these events:​

Leningrad residents lived in constant nervous tension, shelling followed one after another. From September 4 to November 30 of 1941, the city was shelled 272 times for a total of 430 hours. Sometimes people were left in bomb shelters for almost a day. On September 15, 1941 the bombardment lasted 18 hours and 32 minutes, on September 17 - 18 hours and 33 minutes. All in all, during the blockade about 150 thousand shells were fired on Leningrad. The firepower of German artillery, which tried to break the resistance of defenders of the besieged city, was very significant. The German artillery grouping in the Uritsk area, where the front line was closest to Leningrad, consisted of four artillery regiments, armed with 105 mm and 150 mm guns. Later heavy guns (203 mm and 210 mm) with 30-32 km range were thrown here.

Pay attention: on September 15 the bombardment lasted 18 hours and not one gun, but the whole artillery of the front was shooting. On St. Isaac's Cathedral they even put up a commemorative plaque on this occasion (in honor of immortalization of the fact of shells hitting the column of St. Isaac's Cathedral). But an elementary check of this figure shows that it was taken from the ceiling and in no way reflects real events (at the time of the end of the siege of Leningrad).

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The plaque: "THOSE ARE THE TRACES OF ONE OF THE 148478 SHELLS FIRED BY FASCISTS ON LENINGRAD IN THE YEARS 1941-1944"​

This can be proven easily! Let's take a long-range big caliber gun (155, 203 or 210 mm). This gun makes one shot in two (2) minutes. In an hour this gun makes 30 shots. In a working day - 240 shots (8-hour working day, we remember that the German soldiers fought according to the schedule, they are not robots, they have to eat and rest), in 18 hours of continuous shooting the gun makes 540 shots, in 430 hours - 12 900 shots. Accordingly, an artillery battery in the same time makes 77,400 shots, and an artillery division makes 232,200 shots. In 900 days of siege 1 such gun makes "only" 216,000 shots.

The standard artillery battery of our and German armies consisted of 6 guns, an artillery division - 18 guns, and such divisions at the front in the German army were sufficiently numerous, all cities after the war were a ruin.

Thus, from checking the information given in writing by historians, we can conclude that the fallen shells were much more numerous, as confirmed by the destruction of Leningrad. The constant repetition of this fact by historians shows their inability or unwillingness to move away from the established myth.

The second fact, which is very alarming in the description of the Siege of Leningrad, is the complete non-compliance with the Law of Conservation of Matter and Energy.

The third fact is the constant giveaway game on the part of the German troops.

Let's start with the giveaway. Von Leib, commander of Army North, was a competent and experienced commander. He had up to 40 divisions (including tank divisions) under his command. The front in front of Leningrad was 70 km long. The density of troops was up to 2-5 km per division in the direction of the main assault. Only historians, who know nothing about military affairs, could talk about the fact that under such conditions he could not take the city.

We have repeatedly seen in feature films about the defense of Leningrad, how German tankers drive into the suburbs, crush and shoot the streetcar. The front was broken through, and there was no one in front of them. In their memoirs, Von Leib and many other German Army commanders claimed that they were forbidden to take the city, given orders to withdraw from advantageous positions.

The next interesting point
It is known that the Kirov plant worked all through the blockade. The second fact is also known - it was 3 (three!!!) kilometers from the front line. For the people who did not serve in the army, I would say that a bullet of Mosin rifle can fly to such a distance if you shoot in the right direction (I say nothing about artillery guns of larger caliber).

The inhabitants were evacuated from the area of Kirov factory, but the factory continued to operate under the noses of the German command, and it was not destroyed (although one lieutenant-artiller with a battery of not the largest caliber, with enough ammunition and if the task was properly set, could have completed this task).

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On historical myths and reality
Kirov plant produced different products: KV-1 tanks, SAU-152 self-propelled vehicles, by 1943 they mastered the production of IS-1 and IS-2 tanks (SAU-152 tanks are being assembled in the background). From the photos posted on the Internet we can imagine the scale of tank production (it is a large and serial production). In addition to the Kirov Plant, the other Leningrad plants were also working, producing shells and other military products.

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KV-1, SAU-152, IS-2, the scale of production

Since the spring of 1942, streetcar traffic was resumed in Leningrad...

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This is just a small part of reality, very different from the historical myths written by professional historians.

Now a little about physics.
One of the questions that no "historian" can answer is: where did they get the electrical energy in the right quantity?

For the basic law of physics states that energy does not come from nowhere and does not disappear, and translated into everyday language, it sounds like this: as much energy was produced, as much energy was spent (and no more). There are standards in man-hours and units of energy consumed per unit of production, let it be a shell or a tank, and these standards are not insignificant.

A little bit of economics
On the basis of the norms of that time, a certain amount of resources and materials was distributed between the factories without any excess in accordance with the plans and objectives. On the basis of this distribution were created minimum stocks of raw materials, tools and finished products in the factories, providing uninterrupted operation of the plants (usually for two weeks, less often for a month) with a constant supply of necessary resources (in accordance to extraction or production) and shipment of finished products.

Under the conditions of blockade of a single city there are no such strategic reserves of fuel, raw materials, material means and energy, capable to meet the needs of the city (or at least industry) for more than three months. Austerity in energy and food can stretch the stockpiles, but to save energy it is required to stop production - the main consumer of energy, and this did not happen. Plants in Leningrad did not stop for a day.

One can agree with the assumption that some of the coal for energy production was taken from the fleet, but the main base of the fleet was Tallinn, and it was captured. Thermal power plants consume many times more coal than any ship. Let's see what "historians" and "chroniclers" write about this:

With particular fierceness the German pilots targeted the plants and factories of Leningrad, such as Kirov, Izhora, "Elektrosila", and "Bolshevik". In addition, there was a shortage of raw materials, tools, and supplies. It was unbearably cold in the workshops, and touching metal made one's hands twinge. Many production workers carried out their work by sitting down, as it was impossible to stand for 10-12 hours. Due to the stoppage of almost all power plants, some machines had to be set in motion manually, which increased the working day. Often some of the workers stayed overnight in the shop, saving time for urgent front orders. As a result of such selfless labor activity in the second half of 1941 the acting army received from Leningrad 3 million shells and mines, more than 3 thousand regimental and anti-tank guns, 713 tanks, 480 armored cars, 58 armored trains and armored cars.

2. The workers of Leningrad also helped the other sections of the Soviet-German front. In autumn 1941, during fierce battles for Moscow, the city on the Neva sent the Western Front troops more than a thousand pieces of artillery and mortars, as well as a significant number of other weapons.

In difficult circumstances in the fall of 1941, the main task of the workers of the besieged city was to supply the front with weapons, ammunition, equipment and uniforms. Despite the evacuation of a number of enterprises, the capacity of the Leningrad industry remained significant. In September 1941, the city's enterprises produced over a thousand 76 mm guns, over two thousand mortars, hundreds of anti-tank guns and machineguns.


The fact remains: the number of manufactured products has been counted and announced, you can't argue with the fact. Now let's think a little bit about what historians actually wrote.

The first issue - about the way of delivery from the besieged city to an operating army (for the most part near Moscow) of 713 tanks, 3000 weapons, million shells and the main thing - 58 armored trains - all this is possible to take out only by rails, and no less than 100 echelons are required. For tanks and armored trains are not carried on boats (such boats (ferries) did not exist yet).

The second issue is that mass production is voiced (and this is under siege). Only illiterate people can tell tales about how something can be produced without raw materials, and, even more so, tools! An example of adaptation to production under conditions of material shortage is this self-propelled howitzer, and it is a piece product for Leningrad defense needs in addition to the 713 tanks produced, since it is mounted on a tank hull with engine, tracks and armor.

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Self-propelled howitzer

All this points to a constant supply of necessary materials and raw materials. After all, in the blockaded city of Leningrad there were no coal mines, iron ore and other deposits to supply the industry with coal, steel, coke, fluxes and other materials!

"Historians" claim that machines were turned by hand - this is just a conjecture of people who are technically illiterate: try to turn by hand and grind a metal workpiece on a machine tool with a 3-10 kW drive (and these are the drives of industrial drilling and turning machines). You will immediately realize that this is the most common fiction, the hands are not only unable to provide the necessary speed of rotation, they can't even turn such a machine tool!

"Historians" also argue that the main reason for the increase in working hours was not the heroic urge to give everything for the common victory, but the lack of electricity. From the works of the "historians":

In the autumn and winter of 1941/42 the Soviet artillery fought in extremely difficult conditions: there was a lack of ammunition, means of artillery reconnaissance, corrective aviation, the range of the Soviet guns at first was inferior to the German, so up to the spring of 1942 the resistance against the enemy artillery had a defensive character, although retaliatory strikes of Soviet artillery weakened the combat power of the enemy.

Still it is interesting - they did not have enough shells themselves or they forwarded 3 million shells to the army! Why? Did they have no problems in the blockade? And how did they increase the range of the guns? They probably rolled the guns closer! This is another example not only of illiterate presentation and misunderstanding of the information, but a complete falsification!

The range of the gun itself does not increase or decrease, and was originally set by the design parameters! The historians should have indicated that new guns with increased range were designed, manufactured, tested and accepted for service. It seems that historians wrote so hoping that no one would read it or analyze it...

Now let's deal with the production of electricity
There were five thermal power plants on the territory of Leningrad, they were part of the power system of the Leningrad Oblast'. The energy specialists write about that time as follows:​

Energy Blockade
After the siege closed around Leningrad on September 8, 1941 the city was cut off from all out-of-town power plants, which supplied it with energy. Many substations and power lines were destroyed. In Leningrad itself only five thermal power plants were operating. But even there, due to the lack of fuel, power generation was sharply reduced, which was enough only for hospitals, bakeries and government buildings related to the front. Transfer of power from the Volkhov hydroelectric station, the basic equipment of which in October 1941 was dismantled and transported to the Urals and Central Asia. At the station remained in operation two auxiliary hydroelectric units of 1000 kW, working for the railway junction Volkhovstroy and military units. Work of defense plants was paralyzed, streetcars and trolley buses stopped, water supply system stopped working. Many power engineers went to the front, and the rest continued to work in harsh conditions of hunger and cold, generating as much electricity as possible. The energy blockade of Leningrad began. The hardest day for the power industry of Leningrad was January 25th 1942. Only one station in the entire energy system worked, carrying a load of only 3,000 kW...

Let us comment a little on the article: From September 1941 the production of electricity was reduced due to the regime of extreme austerity. By January 1942, the city had run out of coal, the thermal power plants had practically stopped, and only 3,000 kW was produced. At the same time Volkhov hydroelectric station generated 2000 kW (2 MW), and this was enough only for the railway junction and military units (that is, pay attention to the figure - 2 megawatts is very little in the scale of the city).

During the Great Patriotic War, when most of the power plants of the besieged Leningrad could not operate due to lack of fuel. In the winter of 1941-1942 the boiler No.3 at the Krasny Oktyabr power plant was converted for burning milled peat, which was available at the peat enterprises of Vsevolozhsk area. The start-up of this unit made it possible to increase the load of the power plant to 21-22 thousand kW of the 23-24 thousand kW generated by the system. (Wikipedia)

That is, the final figure is announced: the entire system (more precisely, one thermal power plant on peat plus the Volzhsk HPP) was producing 24 thousand kilowatts until the end of the war. The figure only seems large, but, for example, let me cite that this energy is not enough for one city (like, for example, Grodno with 338 thousand people) to boil electric kettles at the same time.

In Leningrad from the spring of 1942 there were 6 streetcar routes. To provide this power consumption 3.6 thousand kW of electricity (3.6 MW) was required. So that each route has 20 streetcars with a total of 120 (in total), with an assumed motor power of 30 (!) kW (for example, modern streetcars have a power of up to 200 kW).

Now a bit about materials and production
We can discuss a lot of history, but the fact remains - shells, mortars, cannons and tanks are made of iron or special types of steel. This is known to be a hard material, machined mostly by pressure (whether with a hammer or a chisel) and requires a lot of effort (mostly mechanical), especially in mass production. Welding tank armor requires a huge amount of electricity (it's not like welding a car body out of tin), industrial welding machines have a capacity of up to 40 kW.

It remains to strike a balance on electric power
With the remaining power (20 MW) it is necessary to power the production plants, and that is:​
  • tens of thousands of machines of 3-10 kW each (millions of shells, bolts, bushings, keys, shafts, etc. are made), - 30-100 MW (this is if there are 10 thousand machines in all factories);
  • dozens of machine tools for the production of gun barrels (large size lathes and screw-cutting machines),
  • rolling mills (you can't have armor plates without it),
  • a lot of industrial welding units (after all, they produced 713 tanks in half a year, 5 tanks a day), the tank was not welded for one day. If we assume that a tank is welded by one welding unit for three days, then 15 welding units with a total capacity of 600 kW are required.
And as a result of elementary calculations we get that we greatly lack the remaining energy (20 MW), and we need to provide light to the Regional and City Party Committees, the Regional Council and City Council, the NKVD office, hospitals, etc.

It remains to sum up the balance of food
Foodstuffs demand of the city was (2 million 544 thousand city inhabitants - without forces, fleet and inhabitants of the oblast' inside the siege) 1.5 kg of food daily (500 grams of crackers and 1 kg of vegetables and cereals - general army ration) - 3800 tons of food daily (63 modern wagons) - I remind you, it is not taking into account the number of troops and navy and inhabitants of the oblast'.

Secondary account of foodstuffs conducted on 10th and 11th of September showed that Leningrad had supply of grain, flour and crackers for 35 days, cereals and pasta for 30 days, meat and meat products for 33 days, fats for 45 days, sugar and confectionery for 60 days (by November everything was to be finished, and that with the account of half of consumption).

To alleviate the food situation in Leningrad, the transport planes were assigned to airlift the cargoes. Food deliveries, along with a special air group created in late June 1941 to serve the Northern Front, were handled by the Moscow Special Purpose Aviation Group, formed from 30 Moscow crews of civil aviation. From September to December 1941 the heroic efforts of the Soviet pilots delivered more than 6 thousand tons of cargo to the besieged city, including 4325 tons of high-calorie food and 1660 tons of ammunition and weapons (in 3 months they brought food for two days. It is not clear, why ammunition was brought, if in Leningrad it was produced and transported to the mainland).

Totally till the end of navigation in 1941 60 thousands tons of various cargoes were delivered to the besieged city by water, including 45 thousands tons of foodstuffs (wikipedia) (for 20 more days of foodstuffs).

All in all the ice road worked till April 24 (152 days) during the first blockade winter. During this time 361,109 tons of various goods were transported, including 262,419 tons of food (Wikipedia) (i.e., less than 2,000 tons of food per day were transported - less than the daily demand of the city).

The need for food was solved after the death of almost one million people from starvation and the evacuation of another 1,300,000 refugees during the entire time of the road of life.

Conclusions
By November not only the coal was about to run out (which happened) but also all the raw materials and food supplies. By means of austerity these supplies were stretched to January. Delivery by the road of life in cars with carrying capacity of 1.5 tons met only the food needs (and even that not completely). It is not disclosed by "historians" what were the 100 000 tons of other goods, brought in the first winter, but the needs of industry were not covered (thousands and thousands of tons). Industry had to come to a halt.

But the plants kept working and working (this is a fact). Where the additional energy came from, it is not known (probably supplied by the Germans). Where the resources came from, and how the finished products were shipped, is also unclear.

At the same time, the German command only had to destroy only 5 power plants (at the beginning of the war and one after January 1942), which were well visible to correctors of artillery fire by the smoke from the pipes, to completely paralyze the entire activity of the city. Is this another accidental inattention?

It is absolutely unclear why 713 KV tanks did not solve the issue of lifting the siege of Leningrad, because at the beginning of the war we had only 636 KV tanks, and these tanks were not penetrated by German guns. The simultaneous and massive use of these tanks would have been able to penetrate any defense with the support of 3,000 guns (and at the beginning of the war we had only 1,928 guns) even in the absence of ammunition austerity. This number of tanks and artillery should have been enough to push the Germans back even to the border.

This example shows the absence of any logic in our enemy, our command and a complete violation of the law of conservation of matter and energy in the historical reality.

We still have to deal with the history of the Great Patriotic War. There are many incomprehensible moments.

It is not clear with what kind of weaponry the German troops destroyed about 20,000 (twenty thousand) of our tanks by the winter of 1941, while they themselves had only 4,171 tanks and spgs.

It is incomprehensible how we lost another large part of the 104840 tanks and spgs produced during the war, with most of the tanks being repaired and returned to combat more than once. Such losses are recorded only once in real history - during the six-day Arab-Israeli war, when Israeli troops destroyed nearly two thousand tanks (but then there were ATGMs and another level of jet aviation).

If the factories had stood idle in Leningrad for lack of raw materials and supplies, everything would have been understandable - after all, it was the blockade and the main thing was to bring food, and we would think about production later. But at a time when people were starving to death, on the move and freezing with their families, it is unclear where raw materials, tools and assemblies for the plants (tank guns were manufactured at the Motovilikhinsky plant in Perm', and until February 1942 it was the only plant that produced tank and naval guns) and electricity for production, and manufactured products were transported to the mainland - it is impossible to explain this by any fairy tales and myths.

The inhabitants of Leningrad, like the inhabitants of the entire country, performed an inconceivable feat. Many of them gave their lives in the battles for the Motherland, many died of starvation in Leningrad, bringing the hour of victory closer. Pavel Korchagin's feat pales in comparison to the efforts made every day by the heroic defenders and heroic residents of the besieged city.

At the same time, elementary calculations show that much information is simply hidden from us, making it impossible to explain the rest. There is an impression of global betrayal, that the whole blockade was deliberately organized in order to kill as many people as possible.

The time will come, and the true culprits will be uncovered and convicted, even in absentia.
 
Another interesting article: «Ромовые бабы» блокадного Ленинграда

"Rum cakes" of the besieged Leningrad
Posted on February 4, 2014 - 03:47​

It turns out that during the Great Patriotic War in the confectionery factory of Leningrad chocolate and candy, as well as other confectionery products were made continuously throughout the blockade. It was prohibited to take out these products under the threat of being shot.

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The mystery of the siege photographs

When I translated Hasso Stakhov's book "The Tragedy on the Neva" ("Centrpoligraf" Publishers, Moscow, 2008) I noticed the following sentence: "Only today we have access to photographs from Soviet archives which show us the production of cakes and candies in Leningrad confectionary factories for the party elite at the Smolny. They date from December 1941, when hundreds of people were already dying of starvation every day" (pp. 7-8).

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To be honest, I did not believe the German writer at the time. But by virtue of my military profession, as a former officer of information-analytical services, I became interested in the source used by Stakhov. It was a German book "Blockade Leningrad 1941-1944" (Rovolt Publishers, 1992), with these photos. The authors of this book stated that the pictures they found belong to the Central State Archives of Cinematography and Photodocuments in St. Petersburg.

Visiting it, I showed there a German book with these photos. I put on the table nearby a recently published photoalbum "Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War" (the Publishing Polygraphic Service Center, St. Petersburg, 2005) with the explanatory text by Valentin Mikhaylovich Kovalchuk, PhD in history. There is one of the "German" photos on the page 78.

The caption in the national photo album said: "On 12.12.1941 of the 2nd confectionery plant. Workshop chief A.N.Pavlov, master-confectioner S.A.Krasnobaev and handmaid E.F.Zakharova, at the inspection of ready loaves (or bars)". Kovalchuk was firmly convinced that it was exclusively about the siege bread.

The German version of the signature was similar except for the last words. It sounded there as "inspection of finished products". That is, the meaning of the phrase was broader.

I waited impatiently for the original photograph to arrive, so that I could find out if these were bread loaves or some other products that most resembled chocolate bars?

When archive workers put this photo on the table, it turned out that it was taken on December 12, 1941 by journalist A. Mikhailov. He was a famous TASS photographer, that is, he took photos by official order, which is important for further understanding of the situation.

It is possible that Mikhailov, indeed, received an official order to reassure the Soviet people living in the Big Land. It was necessary to show the Soviet people that the situation in Leningrad was not so dire. Therefore, one of the confectionery factories was taken as an object, which, as it turned out, did in fact continue to make sweet products for the selected few in the starving city, according to the so-called "letter ration". Corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, famous writers such as Vsevolod Vishnevsky, high-ranking military and party officials, and Smolny officials used it. As it turned out, they were not so few in number, considering that at least an entire department of the confectionery factory worked for them. And these products were not subject to any blockade cards.

Moreover, it was classified, at the level of military secrecy, like the production of ammunition and military equipment.

It is possible that this photo was indeed printed in some of the Soviet newspapers. Maybe the contrast on the photo was intentionally increased to blacken the look of the manufactured products, turning them into "ready-made loaves." But that is just my guess. Most likely, the commissioners of the photo realized that this was too much and hid it in the archives for a long time.

What was written under the photo immediately after it was made is unknown. The archive card for the photo was made on October 3, 1974 and that is when the record about inspection of "ready loaves" was made. Apparently, because of the sharp contrast of the photo the card-writer did not see the character of the production and paid attention only to the haggard faces. Or maybe he did not want to see it. It is symbolic that it was in the '70s that the card received such a signature. At that time, on the wave of the personality cult of Brezhnev and the CPSU leadership, it was widely propagandized that the famine of the blockade affected everyone without exception, including, of course, the party apparatus as "an inseparable part of the people. The slogan: "The People and the Party are One" was then universally introduced.

No one, therefore, could have had any idea that the confectionery factory was still producing chocolates during the blockade winter of 1941, as our photographs now testify.

In the same archive I managed to find two more interesting photos.
On the first of them (see photo at the beginning of the article), with a close-up of a man against the background of cakes spread all over the table, there is the following caption:

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"V.A. Abakumov, the best shift foreman of the "enka" confectionery factory. The team under his leadership regularly exceeds the norm. On the photo: Comrade Abakumov checks the quality of Vienna Cakes. 12.12.1941. Photo: A.Mikhailov, TASS".

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depicts the process of making "rum cakes". The caption reads: "12.12.1941. The making of "rum cakes" at the 2nd Confectionery Factory. A.Mikhailov TASS".

As you can see from these signatures, there was no longer any mystery about the nature of the production. I confess that when I realized all this, I was very bitter. I had the feeling that I had been deceived, and in the most unconscionable way. It turned out that I had existed for many years in the darkness of lies, but it was even more offensive to realize that thousands of my fellow Leningrad citizens were still living in this darkness.

Perhaps that is why I began to tell people the story of these photographs in various audiences. I became increasingly interested in their reactions to it. The majority of people at first were rather skeptical about this information. When I showed the pictures, there was silence and then people started talking as if they had a breakthrough.

That's what Maya Aleksandrovna Sergeeva, the head of the library at the Museum of Defense and Siege of Leningrad, told me, for example. It turned out that such cases were known to her through stories. In the summer of 1950, while still a girl, she heard a similar story at a dacha near Leningrad, when she saw a woman who hung 17 coats out to dry. Sergeeva asked: "Whose things are these?" She replied that they had belonged to her since the siege. "How so?" - the girl was surprised.

It turned out that the woman worked in a chocolate factory in besieged Leningrad. Chocolate and candy and other confections were made there continuously throughout the blockade, she said. Inside the factory it was possible to consume all the chocolate products without any restrictions. But it was strictly forbidden, under threat of execution, to take anything out. This woman's mother was starving at the time, so she decided to take out a bundle of chocolates hidden in her hair. She had amazingly thick hair, which she kept even into her 50s. The hardest and scariest part was sneaking the first pack of stolen products. But thanks to that, mother survived.

Then she began to do it regularly, selling chocolates or exchanging them for bread and other things that were in particular demand at the "flea markets." Gradually she began to have enough money not only to buy bread, but also to buy expensive items. Perhaps 17 coats were not all she could bargain for in starving Leningrad, when people were selling everything for next to nothing. This was especially evident in the spring and summer of 1942, when the population began to be sent in an organized evacuation. Everywhere were pasted on the walls the notices of urgent sale of things, in fact, for next to nothing. This was the first thing speculators took advantage of.

Recently I read in a book "Living Monuments" by A. Panteleev (Soviet writer, 1967, p. 125) that in the fiercest days of the siege a telegraphic inquiry came to the regional committee of Leningrad trade unions from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet government was evacuated: "Report the results of the ski cross and the number of participants".
After that I finally recognized Hasso Stakhov, who had written in "Tragedy on the Neva" that "for the red lords the gingerbread was intended, but for the people it was the whip and death".
 
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Information from the second part:

In Leningrad at the time there were many oddities and incomprehensibilities, which we will now articulate, using many excerpts from the article by Alexey Kungurov.

Unfortunately, no reasonable and justifiable explanations of what was happening at that time in Leningrad have yet been found. Therefore we have to hope that correctly formulated questions will help me and you to find or calculate the right answers.

In our additions to Alexey Kungurov's materials we will also use only publicly available and widely known information, repeatedly voiced and confirmed by photos, maps and other documents.

So, let's go in order.

First Mystery
Where did the term come from?

There was no blockade of the city of Leningrad. This sonorous term, most likely, was invented to shift the blame for the mass casualties among the city's population onto the Germans. But there was no encirclement of the city of Leningrad in the war!

In the summer of 1941, according to publicly available information, a certain, quite large territory of several thousand square kilometers, where the city of Leningrad was and is located now, was cut off by the German troops from the rest of the country. It happened at the end of August 1941:

"After fierce battles, the 39th German Motorized Corps captured a major railway junction Mga on August 30. The last railroad connecting Leningrad with the country was cut...". (Окружение Ленинграда с востока. Битва за Ленинград (1941-1944) - lenbat.narod.ru).

This map shows well the encircled area in which Leningrad was located:

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Defense of Leningrad

Second Mystery
Why were there so few shells?

A. Kungurov's article begins with an analysis of the written statement that 148,478 shells fell on the city during the blockade. Historians describe these events as follows:

Leningrad residents lived in constant nervous tension, shelling followed one after another. From September 4 to November 30 of 1941, the city was shelled 272 times for a total of 430 hours. Sometimes people were left in bomb shelters for almost a day. On September 15, 1941 the bombardment lasted 18 hours and 32 minutes, on September 17 - 18 hours and 33 minutes. All in all, during the blockade about 150 thousand shells were fired on Leningrad. The firepower of German artillery, which tried to break the resistance of defenders of the besieged city, was very significant. The German artillery grouping in the Uritsk area, where the front line was closest to Leningrad, consisted of four artillery regiments, armed with 105 mm and 150 mm guns. Later heavy guns (203 mm and 210 mm) with 30-32 km range were thrown here.

Alexey Kungurov shows by simple arithmetic calculations that this figure is taken from the ceiling and may differ from reality by several orders of magnitude! One artillery division of 18 cannons of great calibre for the mentioned 430 hours of shelling is able to make 232 000 shots!

But the siege, according to the well-established data, lasted much longer than three weeks, and the enemy had several hundred times more guns. Therefore, the number of dropped shells, which the newspapers of the time wrote about, and then repeated by all those who wrote us about the blockade, should have been several orders of magnitude greater, if the blockade had taken place in the way we were all accustomed to.

On the other hand, many photographs of the siege of Leningrad show that the destruction in the central part of the city was minimal! This is only possible if the enemy was prevented from attacking the city with artillery and aviation.

However, judging by the map referenced above, the enemy was only a few kilometers from the city, and the reasonable question of why the city and military factories were not completely turned into ruins in a couple or three weeks remains open.

Unknown siege of Leningrad.1941-44 (62 photos)
Siege of Leningrad
Siege of Leningrad (60 photos)
[S: If you want, you can archive those photos here]

Third Mystery
Why was there no order?

The Germans had no order to occupy Leningrad. Kungurov writes very clearly about this as follows:

Von Leib, commander of Army North, was a competent and experienced commander. He had up to 40 divisions (including tank divisions) under his command. The front in front of Leningrad was 70 km long. The density of troops was up to 2-5 km per division in the direction of the main assault. Only historians, who know nothing about military affairs, could talk about the fact that under such conditions he could not take the city.

We have repeatedly seen in feature films about the defense of Leningrad, how German tankers drive into the suburbs, crush and shoot the streetcar. The front was broken through, and there was no one in front of them. In their memoirs, Von Leib and many other German Army commanders claimed that they were forbidden to take the city, given orders to withdraw from advantageous positions.

Isn't it true that German troops behaved very strangely: instead of easily taking the city and attacking further (we understand that militia, which we were shown in the film, cannot render serious resistance to regular troops in principle), the invaders stood near Leningrad for almost 3 years, allegedly having blocked all land approaches to it.

And taking into account that, most likely, there were no or very few counterattacks from the defensive side, it was not war, but the real sanatorium for the advancing German troops! It would be interesting to know the real reaction of the German command to this legend of the blockade.

Forth Mystery
Why did the Kirov factory work?

It is known that the Kirov plant worked all through the blockade. The second fact is also known - it was 3 (three!!!) kilometers from the front line. For the people who did not serve in the army, I would say that a bullet of Mosin rifle can fly to such a distance if you shoot in the right direction (I say nothing about artillery guns of larger caliber).

The inhabitants were evacuated from the area of Kirov factory, but the factory continued to operate under the noses of the German command, and it was not destroyed (although one lieutenant-artiller with a battery of not the largest caliber, with enough ammunition and if the task was properly set, could have completed this task).

Do you understand what it says? It says here that the fierce enemy who had been continuously shooting from cannons and bombing the encircled city of Leningrad for three years did not bother to destroy the Kirov factory which produced military equipment, though it could have been done in one day!

How can this be explained? Either the Germans could not shoot at all, or they had no order to destroy the enemy's factory, which is no less fantastic than the first assumption, or the German troops, who were standing near Leningrad, performed another function, so far unknown to us...

To understand what a city really treated by artillery and aviation looks like, you can see photos of Stalingrad, which was shelled not for 3 years, but for much less time...

1635099371394.png
1635099405840.png
1635099476775.png


Fifth Mystery
How was the Kirov factory supplied?

Kirov plant produced different products: KV-1 tanks, SAU-152 self-propelled vehicles, by 1943 they mastered the production of IS-1 and IS-2 tanks (SAU-152 tanks are being assembled in the background). From the photos posted on the Internet we can imagine the scale of tank production (it is a large and serial production). In addition to the Kirov Plant, the other Leningrad plants were also working, producing shells and other military products.

Since the spring of 1942, streetcar traffic was resumed in Leningrad...

This is just a small part of reality, very different from the historical myths written by professional historians.

In order to operate and produce a large machine-building enterprise, such as Kirov Plant was, a very serious, constant supply is needed. And it must be not only electricity in necessary and quite large quantities, but also raw materials (metal of necessary brands in thousands of tons), thousands of components, thousands of tools, food and water for the workers and much more.

Besides, we had to dispose of the finished product! These are not fountain pens! They were large items which could only be transported by ship or rail. And the fact that the products were manufactured is confirmed by written evidence:

With particular fierceness the German pilots targeted the plants and factories of Leningrad, such as Kirov, Izhora, "Elektrosila", and "Bolshevik". In addition, there was a shortage of raw materials, tools, and supplies. It was unbearably cold in the workshops, and touching metal made one's hands twinge. Many production workers carried out their work by sitting down, as it was impossible to stand for 10-12 hours. Due to the stoppage of almost all power plants, some machines had to be set in motion manually, which increased the working day. Often some of the workers stayed overnight in the shop, saving time for urgent front orders. As a result of such selfless labor activity in the second half of 1941 the acting army received from Leningrad 3 million shells and mines, more than 3 thousand regimental and anti-tank guns, 713 tanks, 480 armored cars, 58 armored trains and armored cars.

2. The workers of Leningrad also helped the other sections of the Soviet-German front. In autumn 1941, during fierce battles for Moscow, the city on the Neva sent the Western Front troops more than a thousand pieces of artillery and mortars, as well as a significant number of other weapons.

In difficult circumstances in the fall of 1941, the main task of the workers of the besieged city was to supply the front with weapons, ammunition, equipment and uniforms. Despite the evacuation of a number of enterprises, the capacity of the Leningrad industry remained significant. In September 1941, the city's enterprises produced over a thousand 76 mm guns, over two thousand mortars, hundreds of anti-tank guns and machineguns.

It's a strange siege: August 30, 1941 rail communication with the "mainland" was broken, and in autumn 1941 the Western Front was sent "more than a thousand pieces of artillery and mortars, as well as a significant number of other weapons..." .

How could such a colossal amount of weapons be taken from the "blockaded" Leningrad to the Western Front, if there was no longer any railway communication? By rafts and boats across Lake Ladoga under continuous bombardment by German artillery and aircraft, which dominated the air at the time?

Theoretically it is possible, but practically it is very unlikely...

Sixth Mystery
Where did the products of the Kirov factory go?

The fact remains: the number of manufactured products has been counted and announced, you can't argue with the fact. Now let's think a little bit about what historians actually wrote.

The first issue - about the way of delivery from the besieged city to an operating army (for the most part near Moscow) of 713 tanks, 3000 weapons, million shells and the main thing - 58 armored trains - all this is possible to take out only by rails, and no less than 100 echelons are required. For tanks and armored trains are not carried on boats (such boats (ferries) did not exist yet).

The second issue is that mass production is voiced (and this is under siege). Only illiterate people can tell tales about how something can be produced without raw materials, and, even more so, tools! An example of adaptation to production under conditions of material shortage is this self-propelled howitzer, and it is a piece product for Leningrad defense needs in addition to the 713 tanks produced, since it is mounted on a tank hull with engine, tracks and armor.

All this points to a constant supply of necessary materials and raw materials. After all, in the blockaded city of Leningrad there were no coal mines, iron ore and other deposits to supply the industry with coal, steel, coke, fluxes and other materials!

"Historians" claim that machines were turned by hand - this is just a conjecture of people who are technically illiterate: try to turn by hand and grind a metal workpiece on a machine tool with a 3-10 kW drive (and these are the drives of industrial drilling and turning machines). You will immediately realize that this is the most common fiction, the hands are not only unable to provide the necessary speed of rotation, they can't even turn such a machine tool!

Seventh Mystery
Were there not enough shells for themselves?

"Historians" also argue that the main reason for the increase in working hours was not the heroic urge to give everything for the common victory, but the lack of electricity. From the works of the "historians":

In the autumn and winter of 1941/42 the Soviet artillery fought in extremely difficult conditions: there was a lack of ammunition, means of artillery reconnaissance, corrective aviation, the range of the Soviet guns at first was inferior to the German, so up to the spring of 1942 the resistance against the enemy artillery had a defensive character, although retaliatory strikes of Soviet artillery weakened the combat power of the enemy.

Still it is interesting - they did not have enough shells themselves or they forwarded 3 million shells to the army! Why? Did they have no problems in the blockade? And how did they increase the range of the guns? They probably rolled the guns closer! This is another example not only of illiterate presentation and misunderstanding of the information, but a complete falsification!

The range of the gun itself does not increase or decrease, and was originally set by the design parameters! The historians should have indicated that new guns with increased range were designed, manufactured, tested and accepted for service. It seems that historians wrote so hoping that no one would read it or analyze it...

Eighth Mystery
Where did the electricity come from?
Now let's deal with the production of electricity
There were five thermal power plants on the territory of Leningrad, they were part of the power system of the Leningrad Oblast'. The energy specialists write about that time as follows:

Energy Blockade
After the siege closed around Leningrad on September 8, 1941 the city was cut off from all out-of-town power plants, which supplied it with energy. Many substations and power lines were destroyed. In Leningrad itself only five thermal power plants were operating. But even there, due to the lack of fuel, power generation was sharply reduced, which was enough only for hospitals, bakeries and government buildings related to the front. Transfer of power from the Volkhov hydroelectric station, the basic equipment of which in October 1941 was dismantled and transported to the Urals and Central Asia. At the station remained in operation two auxiliary hydroelectric units of 1000 kW, working for the railway junction Volkhovstroy and military units. Work of defense plants was paralyzed, streetcars and trolley buses stopped, water supply system stopped working. Many power engineers went to the front, and the rest continued to work in harsh conditions of hunger and cold, generating as much electricity as possible. The energy blockade of Leningrad began. The hardest day for the power industry of Leningrad was January 25th 1942. Only one station in the entire energy system worked, carrying a load of only 3,000 kW...


Let us comment a little on the article: From September 1941 the production of electricity was reduced due to the regime of extreme austerity. By January 1942, the city had run out of coal, the thermal power plants had practically stopped, and only 3,000 kW was produced. At the same time Volkhov hydroelectric station generated 2000 kW (2 MW), and this was enough only for the railway junction and military units (that is, pay attention to the figure - 2 megawatts is very little in the scale of the city).

During the Great Patriotic War, when most of the power plants of the besieged Leningrad could not operate due to lack of fuel. In the winter of 1941-1942 the boiler No.3 at the Krasny Oktyabr power plant was converted for burning milled peat, which was available at the peat enterprises of Vsevolozhsk area. The start-up of this unit made it possible to increase the load of the power plant to 21-22 thousand kW of the 23-24 thousand kW generated by the system. (Wikipedia)

That is, the final figure is announced: the entire system (more precisely, one thermal power plant on peat plus the Volzhsk HPP) was producing 24 thousand kilowatts until the end of the war. The figure only seems large, but, for example, let me cite that this energy is not enough for one city (like, for example, Grodno with 338 thousand people) to boil electric kettles at the same time.

In Leningrad from the spring of 1942 there were 6 streetcar routes. To provide this power consumption 3.6 thousand kW of electricity (3.6 MW) was required. So that each route has 20 streetcars with a total of 120 (in total), with an assumed motor power of 30 (!) kW (for example, modern streetcars have a power of up to 200 kW).

Now a bit about materials and production
We can discuss a lot of history, but the fact remains - shells, mortars, cannons and tanks are made of iron or special types of steel. This is known to be a hard material, machined mostly by pressure (whether with a hammer or a chisel) and requires a lot of effort (mostly mechanical), especially in mass production. Welding tank armor requires a huge amount of electricity (it's not like welding a car body out of tin), industrial welding machines have a capacity of up to 40 kW.

It remains to strike a balance on electric power
With the remaining power (20 MW) it is necessary to power the production plants, and that is:
  • tens of thousands of machines of 3-10 kW each (millions of shells, bolts, bushings, keys, shafts, etc. are made), - 30-100 MW (this is if there are 10 thousand machines in all factories);
  • dozens of machine tools for the production of gun barrels (large size lathes and screw-cutting machines),
  • rolling mills (you can't have armor plates without it),
  • a lot of industrial welding units (after all, they produced 713 tanks in half a year, 5 tanks a day), the tank was not welded for one day. If we assume that a tank is welded by one welding unit for three days, then 15 welding units with a total capacity of 600 kW are required.
And as a result of elementary calculations we get that we greatly lack the remaining energy (20 MW), and we need to provide light to the Regional and City Party Committees, the Regional Council and City Council, the NKVD office, hospitals, etc.

Ninth Mystery
Where was the food coming from?

Foodstuffs demand of the city was (2 million 544 thousand city inhabitants - without forces, fleet and inhabitants of the oblast' inside the siege) 1.5 kg of food daily (500 grams of crackers and 1 kg of vegetables and cereals - general army ration) - 3800 tons of food daily (63 modern wagons) - I remind you, it is not taking into account the number of troops and navy and inhabitants of the oblast'.

Secondary account of foodstuffs conducted on 10th and 11th of September showed that Leningrad had supply of grain, flour and crackers for 35 days, cereals and pasta for 30 days, meat and meat products for 33 days, fats for 45 days, sugar and confectionery for 60 days (by November everything was to be finished, and that with the account of half of consumption).

To alleviate the food situation in Leningrad, the transport planes were assigned to airlift the cargoes. Food deliveries, along with a special air group created in late June 1941 to serve the Northern Front, were handled by the Moscow Special Purpose Aviation Group, formed from 30 Moscow crews of civil aviation. From September to December 1941 the heroic efforts of the Soviet pilots delivered more than 6 thousand tons of cargo to the besieged city, including 4325 tons of high-calorie food and 1660 tons of ammunition and weapons (in 3 months they brought food for two days. It is not clear, why ammunition was brought, if in Leningrad it was produced and transported to the mainland).

Totally till the end of navigation in 1941 60 thousands tons of various cargoes were delivered to the besieged city by water, including 45 thousands tons of foodstuffs (wikipedia) (for 20 more days of foodstuffs).

All in all the ice road worked till April 24 (152 days) during the first blockade winter. During this time 361,109 tons of various goods were transported, including 262,419 tons of food (Wikipedia) (i.e., less than 2,000 tons of food per day were transported - less than the daily demand of the city).

Let us do a little math, too. In order to transport 360 000 tons of cargo, you need to make 360 000 / 1,5 = 240 000 trips, which were performed in 152 days (rounded to 150 days, we do not need high accuracy here). There are 240,000 / 150 = 1,600 trips per day. In a day, we have 60 x 24 = 1440 minutes.

This implies that, in order to provide 1600 trips per day on the "road of life", it was necessary for the cars to move day and night at intervals of just under 1 minute!

But the "road of life" was the ice of Lake Ladoga, cleared of snow (ordinary cars could not drive on deep snow). For driving on ice such an interval is quite acceptable, because the ice is not asphalt, and exceeding the load immediately leads to a disaster and a long stoppage of the entire column.

If everything was as historians and propagandists of those times tell us, then the enemy had a very simple task: periodically shoot at the lake and spoil the road.

After all, it is very easy to ruin an icy road, but it is impossible to "repair" it quickly! It is necessary to clear a detour, and it takes several hours, because it is not possible to send a tractor there - it is too heavy.

Therefore, the statement that in 152 days on the "road of life" 360 thousand tons of cargoes have been transported does not seem plausible, if only because of the given calculations! And after all it was necessary to provide round-the-clock, rhythmic unloading, loading and refueling of cars, and this conveyor should not stop even for a minute!

It was also necessary to have enough vehicles and fuel to bring what needed to be sent to the "mainland" and to take what was brought to the encircled area.

And how many vehicles were involved in this operation? This can be roughly calculated.

From the map it is easy to determine that the distance to be overcome on Lake Ladoga was about 30 kilometers. If we assume that the cars moved at a speed of about 30 km per hour, add 1 hour for loading and 1 hour for unloading, we obtain that each car made 8 trips per day.
Consequently, in order to make 1,600 trips a day, it was necessary to have 200 cars.

Of course this is an ideal arrangement. In reality, the travel time could be more than 1 hour, and vehicles were out of order for various reasons. Therefore the number of cars could be doubled in order to provide the transportation volume indicated.

And all these 400 half-trucks had to be constantly filled with gasoline. Their fuel consumption was about 20 liters per 100 kilometers. During the day each car travelled 480 km, spent at least 100 liters of gasoline. For the entire fleet of cars every day there had to be delivered at least 40 tons of gasoline...

This work, quite feasible in peacetime with constant and sufficient funding, becomes an almost impossible task in wartime with the constant, purposeful opposition of the enemy.

No, I do not doubt that the attempt to organize the supply of the city and region in this way could have taken place. But I am absolutely certain that the results of this work were quite different.

Tenth Mystery
Does it all seem true?

By November not only the coal was about to run out (which happened) but also all the raw materials and food supplies. By means of austerity these supplies were stretched to January. Delivery by the road of life in cars with carrying capacity of 1.5 tons met only the food needs (and even that not completely). It is not disclosed by "historians" what were the 100 000 tons of other goods, brought in the first winter, but the needs of industry were not covered (thousands and thousands of tons). Industry had to come to a halt.

But the plants kept working and working (this is a fact). Where the additional energy came from, it is not known (probably supplied by the Germans). Where the resources came from, and how the finished products were shipped, is also unclear.

At the same time, the German command only had to destroy only 5 power plants (at the beginning of the war and one after January 1942), which were well visible to correctors of artillery fire by the smoke from the pipes, to completely paralyze the entire activity of the city. Is this another accidental inattention?

It is absolutely unclear why 713 KV tanks did not solve the issue of lifting the siege of Leningrad, because at the beginning of the war we had only 636 KV tanks, and these tanks were not penetrated by German guns. The simultaneous and massive use of these tanks would have been able to penetrate any defense with the support of 3,000 guns (and at the beginning of the war we had only 1,928 guns) even in the absence of ammunition austerity. This number of tanks and artillery should have been enough to push the Germans back even to the border.

The available map indeed clearly shows that the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were separated in the area of Schlisselburg by a narrow strip, only 12 km wide!

And to believe that the troops of these fronts, with the huge quantity of powerful military equipment and ammunition, produced in Leningrad, were not able to throw back the Germans from Lake Ladoga at least 20-30 km, is simply impossible!

Moreover, it turns out that in March 1942 there was an epoch-making event: "On March 29, 1942 partisan columns with food for city inhabitants arrived in Leningrad from Pskov and Novgorod regions. The event had a huge propaganda value and demonstrated both the enemy's inability to control the rear of its troops, and the possibility of the regular Red Army to unblock the city, since the guerrillas managed to do it...".

Nevertheless, the encirclement was not broken, and we do not yet know the reasons for this...

Conclusions

1. The city of Leningrad was not blockaded during the war, the blockade of the city, as such, never existed (see map). [S: a lot of dead links in the articles]

2. It is claimed that 1.5 million people were evacuated from Leningrad by October 1942. It is claimed that during the blockade about 1.5 million people died in Leningrad. But before the war only 2.5 million people lived in Leningrad. Where could the additional 0.5 million have come from to die, and who worked for 3 years at the military factories that produced hundreds of tanks, thousands of guns and millions of shells every month? The generally accepted statistics on these issues do not even stand up to basic analysis.

3. If, as it is asserted, 1.5 million people were evacuated from Leningrad in 1.5 years, then the supply of food to 1 million of the remaining people was not a very difficult task. If everything had been as we are told, there would not have been 1.5 million deaths from starvation!!!

4. Elementary calculations convincingly show that it was impossible to supply the military industry with raw materials, supplies, instruments and accessories by motor transports or boats.

5. There is no information on the provision of sufficient power for the city and industry. For the operation of the military factories, which did work, the energy needed was several times more than what was available according to official information.

6. It is absolutely unclear where most of produced military equipment, especially heavy equipment, went. If in Leningrad during 3 months more than 700 heavy tanks were produced, then during 30 months of blockade they could be made so much, that it would be enough to scatter all Europe in the dust!

7. There is no conjecture yet about the reasons why Germans have not destroyed Kirov factory, which was producing military equipment during the time of the "siege", working under their noses (3 kilometers away).

8. Similarly unclear is the reason why the Germans did not destroy Leningrad with artillery and aircraft, although at first had a large advantage in these types of weapons.

9. There is no intelligible explanation for the fact that the encirclement of the area was not broken by Soviet troops. The Leningrad and Volkhov fronts near Schlisselburg were separated by a strip only 12 km wide! Partisans brought food on carts, and regular troops could do nothing. Absurd!

10. It is very likely that variations on the theme of the "blockade" of Leningrad are designed to disguise something much more serious than what we know from publicly available information. It is quite possible that quite different events took place at that time, for the concealment of which millions of lives were sacrificed and which are still carefully concealed...
 
Information from the second part:

In Leningrad at the time there were many oddities and incomprehensibilities, which we will now articulate, using many excerpts from the article by Alexey Kungurov.

Unfortunately, no reasonable and justifiable explanations of what was happening at that time in Leningrad have yet been found. Therefore we have to hope that correctly formulated questions will help me and you to find or calculate the right answers.

In our additions to Alexey Kungurov's materials we will also use only publicly available and widely known information, repeatedly voiced and confirmed by photos, maps and other documents.

So, let's go in order.

First Mystery
Where did the term come from?

There was no blockade of the city of Leningrad. This sonorous term, most likely, was invented to shift the blame for the mass casualties among the city's population onto the Germans. But there was no encirclement of the city of Leningrad in the war!

In the summer of 1941, according to publicly available information, a certain, quite large territory of several thousand square kilometers, where the city of Leningrad was and is located now, was cut off by the German troops from the rest of the country. It happened at the end of August 1941:

"After fierce battles, the 39th German Motorized Corps captured a major railway junction Mga on August 30. The last railroad connecting Leningrad with the country was cut...". (Окружение Ленинграда с востока. Битва за Ленинград (1941-1944) - lenbat.narod.ru).

This map shows well the encircled area in which Leningrad was located:

View attachment 13321
Defense of Leningrad

Second Mystery
Why were there so few shells?

A. Kungurov's article begins with an analysis of the written statement that 148,478 shells fell on the city during the blockade. Historians describe these events as follows:



Alexey Kungurov shows by simple arithmetic calculations that this figure is taken from the ceiling and may differ from reality by several orders of magnitude! One artillery division of 18 cannons of great calibre for the mentioned 430 hours of shelling is able to make 232 000 shots!

But the siege, according to the well-established data, lasted much longer than three weeks, and the enemy had several hundred times more guns. Therefore, the number of dropped shells, which the newspapers of the time wrote about, and then repeated by all those who wrote us about the blockade, should have been several orders of magnitude greater, if the blockade had taken place in the way we were all accustomed to.

On the other hand, many photographs of the siege of Leningrad show that the destruction in the central part of the city was minimal! This is only possible if the enemy was prevented from attacking the city with artillery and aviation.

However, judging by the map referenced above, the enemy was only a few kilometers from the city, and the reasonable question of why the city and military factories were not completely turned into ruins in a couple or three weeks remains open.

Unknown siege of Leningrad.1941-44 (62 photos)
Siege of Leningrad
Siege of Leningrad (60 photos)
[S: If you want, you can archive those photos here]

Third Mystery
Why was there no order?

The Germans had no order to occupy Leningrad. Kungurov writes very clearly about this as follows:



Isn't it true that German troops behaved very strangely: instead of easily taking the city and attacking further (we understand that militia, which we were shown in the film, cannot render serious resistance to regular troops in principle), the invaders stood near Leningrad for almost 3 years, allegedly having blocked all land approaches to it.

And taking into account that, most likely, there were no or very few counterattacks from the defensive side, it was not war, but the real sanatorium for the advancing German troops! It would be interesting to know the real reaction of the German command to this legend of the blockade.

Forth Mystery
Why did the Kirov factory work?



Do you understand what it says? It says here that the fierce enemy who had been continuously shooting from cannons and bombing the encircled city of Leningrad for three years did not bother to destroy the Kirov factory which produced military equipment, though it could have been done in one day!

How can this be explained? Either the Germans could not shoot at all, or they had no order to destroy the enemy's factory, which is no less fantastic than the first assumption, or the German troops, who were standing near Leningrad, performed another function, so far unknown to us...

To understand what a city really treated by artillery and aviation looks like, you can see photos of Stalingrad, which was shelled not for 3 years, but for much less time...

View attachment 13322View attachment 13323View attachment 13324

Fifth Mystery
How was the Kirov factory supplied?



In order to operate and produce a large machine-building enterprise, such as Kirov Plant was, a very serious, constant supply is needed. And it must be not only electricity in necessary and quite large quantities, but also raw materials (metal of necessary brands in thousands of tons), thousands of components, thousands of tools, food and water for the workers and much more.

Besides, we had to dispose of the finished product! These are not fountain pens! They were large items which could only be transported by ship or rail. And the fact that the products were manufactured is confirmed by written evidence:



It's a strange siege: August 30, 1941 rail communication with the "mainland" was broken, and in autumn 1941 the Western Front was sent "more than a thousand pieces of artillery and mortars, as well as a significant number of other weapons..." .

How could such a colossal amount of weapons be taken from the "blockaded" Leningrad to the Western Front, if there was no longer any railway communication? By rafts and boats across Lake Ladoga under continuous bombardment by German artillery and aircraft, which dominated the air at the time?

Theoretically it is possible, but practically it is very unlikely...

Sixth Mystery
Where did the products of the Kirov factory go?



Seventh Mystery
Were there not enough shells for themselves?



Eighth Mystery
Where did the electricity come from?



Ninth Mystery
Where was the food coming from?



Let us do a little math, too. In order to transport 360 000 tons of cargo, you need to make 360 000 / 1,5 = 240 000 trips, which were performed in 152 days (rounded to 150 days, we do not need high accuracy here). There are 240,000 / 150 = 1,600 trips per day. In a day, we have 60 x 24 = 1440 minutes.

This implies that, in order to provide 1600 trips per day on the "road of life", it was necessary for the cars to move day and night at intervals of just under 1 minute!

But the "road of life" was the ice of Lake Ladoga, cleared of snow (ordinary cars could not drive on deep snow). For driving on ice such an interval is quite acceptable, because the ice is not asphalt, and exceeding the load immediately leads to a disaster and a long stoppage of the entire column.

If everything was as historians and propagandists of those times tell us, then the enemy had a very simple task: periodically shoot at the lake and spoil the road.

After all, it is very easy to ruin an icy road, but it is impossible to "repair" it quickly! It is necessary to clear a detour, and it takes several hours, because it is not possible to send a tractor there - it is too heavy.

Therefore, the statement that in 152 days on the "road of life" 360 thousand tons of cargoes have been transported does not seem plausible, if only because of the given calculations! And after all it was necessary to provide round-the-clock, rhythmic unloading, loading and refueling of cars, and this conveyor should not stop even for a minute!

It was also necessary to have enough vehicles and fuel to bring what needed to be sent to the "mainland" and to take what was brought to the encircled area.

And how many vehicles were involved in this operation? This can be roughly calculated.

From the map it is easy to determine that the distance to be overcome on Lake Ladoga was about 30 kilometers. If we assume that the cars moved at a speed of about 30 km per hour, add 1 hour for loading and 1 hour for unloading, we obtain that each car made 8 trips per day.
Consequently, in order to make 1,600 trips a day, it was necessary to have 200 cars.

Of course this is an ideal arrangement. In reality, the travel time could be more than 1 hour, and vehicles were out of order for various reasons. Therefore the number of cars could be doubled in order to provide the transportation volume indicated.

And all these 400 half-trucks had to be constantly filled with gasoline. Their fuel consumption was about 20 liters per 100 kilometers. During the day each car travelled 480 km, spent at least 100 liters of gasoline. For the entire fleet of cars every day there had to be delivered at least 40 tons of gasoline...

This work, quite feasible in peacetime with constant and sufficient funding, becomes an almost impossible task in wartime with the constant, purposeful opposition of the enemy.

No, I do not doubt that the attempt to organize the supply of the city and region in this way could have taken place. But I am absolutely certain that the results of this work were quite different.

Tenth Mystery
Does it all seem true?



The available map indeed clearly shows that the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were separated in the area of Schlisselburg by a narrow strip, only 12 km wide!

And to believe that the troops of these fronts, with the huge quantity of powerful military equipment and ammunition, produced in Leningrad, were not able to throw back the Germans from Lake Ladoga at least 20-30 km, is simply impossible!

Moreover, it turns out that in March 1942 there was an epoch-making event: "On March 29, 1942 partisan columns with food for city inhabitants arrived in Leningrad from Pskov and Novgorod regions. The event had a huge propaganda value and demonstrated both the enemy's inability to control the rear of its troops, and the possibility of the regular Red Army to unblock the city, since the guerrillas managed to do it...".

Nevertheless, the encirclement was not broken, and we do not yet know the reasons for this...

Conclusions

1. The city of Leningrad was not blockaded during the war, the blockade of the city, as such, never existed (see map). [S: a lot of dead links in the articles]

2. It is claimed that 1.5 million people were evacuated from Leningrad by October 1942. It is claimed that during the blockade about 1.5 million people died in Leningrad. But before the war only 2.5 million people lived in Leningrad. Where could the additional 0.5 million have come from to die, and who worked for 3 years at the military factories that produced hundreds of tanks, thousands of guns and millions of shells every month? The generally accepted statistics on these issues do not even stand up to basic analysis.

3. If, as it is asserted, 1.5 million people were evacuated from Leningrad in 1.5 years, then the supply of food to 1 million of the remaining people was not a very difficult task. If everything had been as we are told, there would not have been 1.5 million deaths from starvation!!!

4. Elementary calculations convincingly show that it was impossible to supply the military industry with raw materials, supplies, instruments and accessories by motor transports or boats.

5. There is no information on the provision of sufficient power for the city and industry. For the operation of the military factories, which did work, the energy needed was several times more than what was available according to official information.

6. It is absolutely unclear where most of produced military equipment, especially heavy equipment, went. If in Leningrad during 3 months more than 700 heavy tanks were produced, then during 30 months of blockade they could be made so much, that it would be enough to scatter all Europe in the dust!

7. There is no conjecture yet about the reasons why Germans have not destroyed Kirov factory, which was producing military equipment during the time of the "siege", working under their noses (3 kilometers away).

8. Similarly unclear is the reason why the Germans did not destroy Leningrad with artillery and aircraft, although at first had a large advantage in these types of weapons.

9. There is no intelligible explanation for the fact that the encirclement of the area was not broken by Soviet troops. The Leningrad and Volkhov fronts near Schlisselburg were separated by a strip only 12 km wide! Partisans brought food on carts, and regular troops could do nothing. Absurd!

10. It is very likely that variations on the theme of the "blockade" of Leningrad are designed to disguise something much more serious than what we know from publicly available information. It is quite possible that quite different events took place at that time, for the concealment of which millions of lives were sacrificed and which are still carefully concealed...


Thank you for your time
 
To ad more confusion to this most interesting subject is to question the non-action of Finns during the war. Marshal Mannerheim and President Ryti both refused to further attacks to Leningrad and also to destroy the Muurman track up north. I also remember reading from Mannerheim memoirs (although they were admittedly censored) that he and Stalin were exchanging information about troop movements and plans. Hardly imaginable as something blood enemies would do? So what was really going on then? It would be interesting to make a study of the man material that was sent to frontlines. What kind of men were sent there? I also remember Mannerheim commenting in one of his letters that in his opinion the Rus - Japan war was partially fought in order to get rid of the "enemies in Russia", who were of course well educated military men with some certain principles, IQ, patriots etc. They were the real target.
 
Mannerheim commenting in one of his letters
Very interesting, North seems to be the weirdest part of the war. Were there any more details?

P.S. I didn't mention it in that thread, but a lot of ancient architecture on Kola peninsula (fortresses, thousands of kilometres of stone roads) was attributed to Germans, who stayed there for ~1 year during the war
 
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Very interesting, North seems to be the weirdest part of the war. Were there any more details?

P.S. I didn't mention it in that thread, but a lot of ancient architecture on Kola peninsula (fortresses, thousands of kilometres of stone roads) was attributed to Germans, who stayed there for ~1 year during the war

Something was covered up up North for sure. At the end of the war when Finns made peace with Russia they agreed to throw Germans out of Lappland. What the hell were they doing there in such quantity anyway? I have read some very interesting ideas about Koala peninsulas past. I suppose they were there to dig something, to find an entrance perhaps? Why is that the same place Finns and Russians dug the deepest hole ever?

There were plenty of details but he had to censor his story so one must read between the lines and look for the clues. To me it looks like they were all cooperating in some bigger secret project up there. New border that was drawn at '45 has some clues.

As a side note, Mannerheim also wrote a book about his 2,5 year long reconnaissance trip to Asia (or from Amazon for nice price 2750.00) where he gathered information about people, culture and landscape for Tsar. What makes that interesting is that he went there like an explorer, to investigate what was left of peoples, their future and race. His descriptions of landscape are quite telling, something huge had happened there. He gathered thousands of artefacts and data about people and sent it all to Finno-Ugric society to Helsinki.
 
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Something was covered up up North for sure. At the end of the war when Finns made peace with Russia they agreed to throw Germans out of Lappland. What the hell were they doing there in such quantity anyway? I have read some very interesting ideas about Koala peninsulas past. I suppose they were there to dig something, to find an entrance perhaps? Why is that the same place Finns and Russians dug the deepest hole ever?

There were plenty of details but he had to censor his story so one must read between the lines and look for the clues. To me it looks like they were all cooperating in some bigger secret project up there. New border that was drawn at '45 has some clues.

As a side note, Mannerheim also wrote a book about his 2,5 year long reconnaissance trip to Asia (or from Amazon for nice price 2750.00) where he gathered information about people, culture and landscape for Tsar. What makes that interesting is that he went there like an explorer, to investigate what was left of peoples, their future and race. His descriptions of landscape are quite telling, something huge had happened there. He gathered thousands of artefacts and data about people and sent it all to Finno-Ugric society to Helsinki.

"Something was covered up up North for sure" If memories serve me correct that area was part of Hyperborea? the Russians were making way too many tanks for use on the Eastern Front, by Sasyexa's account.

If I may, the Russian state discovered underground oddities in Siberia while mining for coal, early 1900's then again about 1933. The military entered the equation and blew the cave system blocking the entrances. That did not solve their problem. Sometime after 1933 a Russian Infantry Division, the official story, froze to death while traveling through that same area, about 80,000 died? The number alone is too big for an Infantry Division. A Division is made up of about 3-5 Regiments, which may have 2,500-4,000 men each. Making the 80,000 number a complete Army Corps at a minimum.

Lets jump to Germany 1939 and forward. Supposedly the Germans were getting advanced technologies from an alien source? Maybe that source was located in Siberia living underground?

After the Americans dropped the Atom Bomb the Russians then had access to a weapon that would stop or defeat their underground foe blocking their ability to access the surface. In and around 1954 atomic bombs were used in caves systems to " mine for coal" In Russian there is about 128 Atomic Bomb "Testing Sites" most located near large metropolitan cities.

The Americans tested their bombs in isolated areas such as pacific islands, Nevada Deseret where those cave systems were rumored to exist? But not all over the continent.

Just thinking out loud
 
There is a very definitive pattern of both sides seeming to select courses of action mutually leading to static situations that maximize causalities, destruction and the use of time.

The Wehrmacht's bizarre deployment of the 11th Army after the Battle of Sevastopol comes to mind. The Army commander recommended the formation remain in the theater it was already in (Army Group South) and continue operations. This makes sense from a logistics perspective. Remaining with Army Group South would be reinforcing success which is what one supposedly wants to do at the operational level. Finally, remaining with Army Group South would have been the "easiest" course of action.

Naturally, they divide 11th Army in half, sending a portion with siege equipment to Army Group North supporting the siege of Leningrad. The other half is parceled out to support Army Group South. Neither of these detachments are large enough to make a decisive difference in either theater. The transfer of personnel and equipment creates an even greater strain on an already severely stressed logistics system. Army Group North is never strong enough to isolate (step 1 in any siege at any level) Leningrad and Army Group South does not have sufficient reserve to achieve its objectives.

This example definitely supports the "false opposition" theory. It is shocking that this occurs at every level in every military conflict through the present. There are always cornball explanations given for these sudden shifts along the competence spectrum for military performance through the ages.
 
There is a very definitive pattern of both sides seeming to select courses of action mutually leading to static situations that maximize causalities, destruction and the use of time.

The Wehrmacht's bizarre deployment of the 11th Army after the Battle of Sevastopol comes to mind. The Army commander recommended the formation remain in the theater it was already in (Army Group South) and continue operations. This makes sense from a logistics perspective. Remaining with Army Group South would be reinforcing success which is what one supposedly wants to do at the operational level. Finally, remaining with Army Group South would have been the "easiest" course of action.

Naturally, they divide 11th Army in half, sending a portion with siege equipment to Army Group North supporting the siege of Leningrad. The other half is parceled out to support Army Group South. Neither of these detachments are large enough to make a decisive difference in either theater. The transfer of personnel and equipment creates an even greater strain on an already severely stressed logistics system. Army Group North is never strong enough to isolate (step 1 in any siege at any level) Leningrad and Army Group South does not have sufficient reserve to achieve its objectives.

This example definitely supports the "false opposition" theory. It is shocking that this occurs at every level in every military conflict through the present. There are always cornball explanations given for these sudden shifts along the competence spectrum for military performance through the ages.

Examples of this pattern are everywhere when you start looking. Not only the backdoor communication at the theatre of war between enemies on paper but also the paradigm narratives where all the governments, or inherited crime syndicates as I heard someone fittingly call them, together create and create the illusion of reality via media, academia and schooling of the subjects. wars seem to be fought against the enemy within and for that job its better to hire an outside bogyman to do the job.

Together all these fake nation states make the system aka the matrix. War is just a harvesting tool and its good for reshuffling the cards, creating trauma and fear which are essential for control.

That is all clear. Interesting part is that those positions of power are occupied by a group of people of families who have created their own reality bubble instead of developing a real sense of reality thus they are trapped in their insanity just like their subjects. We are literally living in insane mega society where war and mass destruction of everything is better solution than peace and prosperity.

"Reality is always controlled by the people who are most insane." - Scott Adams, Dilbert
 
There is a very definitive pattern of both sides seeming to select courses of action mutually leading to static situations that maximize causalities, destruction and the use of time.

I'm writing an article on the second world war and a few things really stand out.

1) The Germans had the British airforce on its knees in 1940. Both sides estimated at one point the German bombing of UK airfields would completely destroy the UK airforce within two weeks. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to discontinue targeting UK airfields and instead to target civilians.

2) Most UK planes were powered by the Rolls Royce Merlin engine, which was built in a single factory near Birmingham. The Germans never attempted to bomb it once during the entire war. It's almost as if they wanted the British airforce to continue operating!

3) The destruction of Bristol in 1944, at the time England's largest, most beautiful, and most intact medieval city centre. The Germans never got round to bombing far more important military targets, but they managed to get thousands of bombers into the air to do this. The British high command moved all the jamming devices away from the area, devices that would have been able to jam the German bomber guidance system. Three nights running!
 
I'm writing an article on the second world war and a few things really stand out.

1) The Germans had the British airforce on its knees in 1940. Both sides estimated at one point the German bombing of UK airfields would completely destroy the UK airforce within two weeks. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to discontinue targeting UK airfields and instead to target civilians.

2) Most UK planes were powered by the Rolls Royce Merlin engine, which was built in a single factory near Birmingham. The Germans never attempted to bomb it once during the entire war. It's almost as if they wanted the British airforce to continue operating!

3) The destruction of Bristol in 1944, at the time England's largest, most beautiful, and most intact medieval city centre. The Germans never got round to bombing far more important military targets, but they managed to get thousands of bombers into the air to do this. The British high command moved all the jamming devices away from the area, devices that would have been able to jam the German bomber guidance system. Three nights running!
Those are great examples of bizarre strategic and tactical decisions. Items 1 and 2 definitely lend credence to the fact that the Germans seemed to want the RAF to continue fighting. They always justify these bizarre decisions with the madman Fuhrer argument. However, you can find just as many examples of the Allies doing this as well through the duration of the conflict.

Some other great examples:

1) 1943-1944-The Soviet Union could have easily launched a counteroffensive focused on Riga and a subsequent phase to Poland. The Wehrmacht was overextended in the Soviet Union. Army Group North was besieging Leningrad, Army Group South just lost an Army in Stalingrad and had Army Group A deep in the Caucasus. They could have isolated Army Group North around Leningrad, there would have been no significant Wehrmacht forces to stop the offensive moving to Poland and cutting off both Army Group Center and South. The entire Eastern Front could have been decided before the Normandy Invasion!

Instead, the Soviets commit their forces to Operation Mars, attacking Army Group Center's prepared defenses for a month resulting in an operational failure and heavy loses. Naturally, this is justified by saying this wore down German reserves with the usual excuses. Why easily bypass prepared defenses at the strategic and operational level when you can attack them directly??? This little pattern happens over and over again.

As you said with the Luftwaffe and RAF, it was like the Germans and the Soviets wanted to give each other the ability to keep fighting. We needed to have our post World War II Cold War paradigm and that couldn't have happened if the Red Army was in Berlin in June 1944.

 
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